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Introduction 
The turbulent world economic conditions of the 1970s and 1980s have required major 
adjustments within individual Third World countries. Two distinct responses were made 
by various governments: some reacted rather quickly with internal adjustment policies, 
while others borrowed heavily in order to finance high growth rates or at least to 
postpone economic contraction. Argentina is one of many countries that fall into the 
latter category. 
As the resulting debt service costs have risen and revenues levelled off or declined, 
the Argentine government has been forced to re-evaluate programmes in an effort to 
curtail government spending. This article examines the character of the sectoral 
adjustment that has taken place in the main functional areas of government 
expenditures. 
Nature of the Problem 
To date, the most frequent questions for both policy-makers and researchers in this 
area concern the existence, type and extent of trade-offs incurred by defence 
expenditure[l]. The literature has found a continuum of possible trade-off patterns. 
In general, those studies dealing with the developing countries have found little or 
no evidence of significant trade-offs between defence and other major socio-economic 
budgetary categories. In contrast, most empirical studies dealing with budgetary 
patterns in the developed countries have found a number significant trade-offs. The 
impact of political regime type on defence allocations has also been examined at length 
in the literature[2]. 
While the defence-budgetary trade-off is an interesting one, stimulating a lively 
controversy, perhaps a more relevant focus, given the rapid increases in external debt 
incurred by many developing countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s, concerns the 
trade-offs between debt service and other budgetary allocations. These trade-offs have 
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been inevitable due to limits on the expansion of government expenditures as a result 
of the simultaneous existence of austerity programmes and accelerated debt service 
costs derived from past loans. For example Heller and Cheasty (1984) have shown 
that the tightening fiscal pressures in the late 1970s and early 1980s did have an impact 
on the educational sector in Latin America. Of particular interest was their finding 
that the nature of that impact was not obvious from examining simple ratios of 
educational expenditure to GDP. 
Rather the impact arose from the way in which the authorities in many countries resolved 
the conflict between the budgetary pressures confronting all elements of the public sector 
and the political pressures for expanding enrolments and the attendant fiscal implications 
of such expansion (p. 1047). 
Interestingly enough, no empirical studies other than that of Heller and Cheasty have 
been undertaken to examine whether or not governments systematically reduce the 
share of other expenditure categories as their debt burdens expand [3]. 
In part, this gap in the literature exists because of a dearth of relevant data. 
Fortunately, the recent publication of a detailed breakdown of Argentine central 
government expenditures by category enables us to begin piecing together a picture 
of how governments prioritise sectoral allocations to accommodate debt servicing[4]. 
Based on this new data base the analysis below attempts to provide at least tentative 
answers to several specific questions: 
(1) Is there a significant relationship between debt service and several or all other 
budgetary categories, i.e., what allocations have systematically lost their 
budgetary shares as debt service payments increased? 
(2) What direct role have the country's increasing budgetary deficits over the 1961-82 
period played in influencing the relative allocations to different budgetary 
categories? In other words, have expanding budgetary deficits systematically 
increased or decreased the share allocated to different activities? 
(3) What is the time phasing of budgetary allocation changes to increased debt 
servicing shares in the budget? Are changes made on a year-to-year basis or 
are they adjusted gradually over time? 
(4) To what extent do regime changes (between military and civilian governments) 
modify the patterns found above? Do military or civilian regimes offset or 
reinforce the patterns found in (1) to (3) above? 
Historical Patterns of Public Sector Expenditure, Deficits and Debt Service 
The sectoral composition of expenditure has also varied markedly over time (Table 
I). Only the expansion of public sector debt service (29 per cent per annum) and 
expenditures on domestic police/security functions (7.8 per cent per annum) exceeded 
the average rate of growth for all public sector expenditures during 1961-82 (5.7 per 
cent per annum). Defence (4.8 per cent per annum), social overhead (3.7 per cent) 
and economic development (3.3 per cent) expenditures lagged average expenditure 
growth[5]. As a result, the structure of central government expenditure was substantially 
altered. 
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Table I. Argentina: Composition of Central Government Expenditures, 1961-82, 
(per cent) 
Destination 1961 
Service of public sector financial obligations 0.8 
Economic development 35.0 
Social 31.6 
Defence 21.3 
General administration 6.7 





































Source: World Bank, Argentine, Economic Memorandum, Volume I (Washington: IBRD, 1985), p. 44. 
Servicing of financial obligations grew from the smallest to the largest sub-category 
of expenditure (0.8 per cent of central government outlays in 1961 to 37.1 per cent 
in 1982). Except for spending on domestic security, which maintained its share, 
spending in all other categories declined proportionately during this period. The share 
of expenditures on economic development followed an irregular but clearly downward 
trend (from 35 per cent of expenditures in 1961 to slightly over 20 per cent in 1982). 
Spending in the social sectors, which grew very rapidly in the mid-1970s, rose from 
the second largest to the leading category of expenditure (32 per cent in 1961 to 43 
per cent in 1974) before declining to third position (17 per cent in 1982). 
Defence spending remained the third most important category of expenditure until 
1981, when it was overtaken by service on financial obligations[6]. Expenditures for 
this purpose ranged between 13 per cent and 21 per cent of total central government 
expenditures. 
The fiscal deficit is characterised by three major periods: 
(1) The 1940-55 period, during which there was a steady deterioration in fiscal 
performance, culminating in a prolonged balance of payments crisis and a 
pronounced reduction in economic growth. 
(2) The 1965-71 period, during which the fiscal deficit gradually declined, reaching 
the lowest levels observed since the early 1940s. Considerable year-to-year 
variations in the size of the deficit during this period coincided with periodic 
balance of payments crises, "stop-go" demand management policies, and erratic, 
but moderate, economic growth rates. 
(3) The period to 1972 to 1982, during which fiscal discipline eroded rapidly and 
deficits reached the highest levels in Argentine history. This period was 
characterised by very high rates of inflation during 1975-77 and 1982-83, 
negligible net economic growth, and recurrent external crises. The pattern of 
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deficit financing shows a predominant reliance on domestic borrowing and 
monetary expansion, with external financing playing an increasingly important 
role after 1979. 
The cumulative deficits created a large stock of public debt, the servicing of which 
itself became a major factor in perpetuating large annual deficits, particularly after 
1976. Since then, interest payments on public sector debt have averaged well over half 
the total deficit. 
Increased government expenditures during the period 1961-82 were largely financed 
by government deficits (Table II). By themselves, increased revenues as a per cent of 
GDP accounted for 24.5 per cent (equation (1), Table II) of the observed expansion 
in government expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Adding the central government 
deficit as a percentage of GDP to the regression equation (equation (2), Table II), 
increased explanatory power to 81.8 per cent. Finally, increased debt service payments 
(equation (3), Table II) increased the explanatory power to 97.5 per cent. 






























































































































































































Note: See text for definition of dummy variables. The dependent variable in all equations is the share of government 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP. 
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Change from civilian to military regimes has also been cited as one of the factors 
affecting movements in government expenditures in Argentina[7]. One explanation 
(Richards, 1985) focuses on the management policy of domestic demand within the 
constraints implied by economic openness. In countries like Argentina where political 
stability is contingent on the maintenance of continuous growth, there are powerful 
political constraints on the ability to impose monetary and fiscal restrictions; the 
recessionary costs of disinflation either prevent systematic stabilisation from taking 
place and thus lead to endemic price volatility, or tend to destabilise governments that 
successfully impose restraint because of losses in real economic activity. 
Whatever the role of other factors, the overthrow of democratic systems by the armed 
forces cannot be understood without reference to macroeconomic policy. More 
specifically, the breakdown of democracy typically has taken place during periods 
characterised by simultaneous recession, major accelerations in the inflation rate. and 
exchange rate depreciation. Clearly, it is politically difficult for civilian governments 
to enforce stabilisation, since restrictive actions will reduce domestic output due to 
the contraction in aggregate demand as well as the resulting decline in imported inputs. 
On the other hand, there is clear evidence of a commitment to disinflation on the 
part of military regimes. During the first Argentine dictatorship of 1966-72, the 
inflation rate was originally lowered from 31.7 per cent in 1966 to 7.77 per cent in 
1969. During the second Argentine military regime (1976-82), disinflation was carried 
out through conventional means, i.e. reduced fiscal deficits and monetary restraint 
(see Richards, 1985, pp. 163-4). 
To determine if regime type perse contributed to movements in the share of central 
government expenditures in GDP, several dummy variables depicting the country's 
civilian and military regimes were introduced into the regression equations. During 
the period under examination, four regimes governed: 
(1) 1961-65, period of democracy; 
(2) 1966-72, first military regime; 
(3) 1973-76, civilian Peronist regime; 
(4) 1977-82, second military regime. 
Each of these time periods can be characterised by a distinctive pattern of government 
allocations. There is significant reason to believe, however, that regime type does not 
have the same meaning over time, i.e., that the first and second military regimes might, 
in fact, have few similarities with regard to economic policy, with the same to be said 
for the elected Peronist civilian regime (1973-76) and the non-Peronist civilian regime 
(1961-65). 
Preliminary regression equations testing for structural shifts associated with regime 
type indicated that two dummy variable formulations, DUME (1, 1961-65; 2, 1966-72; 
0, 1973-76; 3, 1977-82) and DUMF (1, 1961-72; 0, 1973-76; 2, 1977-82), gave the best 
results when regressed on the share of government expenditure in GDP. 
DUME assumes the Peronists were most likely to increase the share of government 
expenditures in GDP, followed by the first civilian regime, then the first military regime, 
with the second military regime least likely to increase government expenditures. DUMF 
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assumes no real change in policy over government expenditures in the 1960s, a sharp 
increase in government expenditures under the populist Peronists, followed by sharp 
austerity policies imposed by the second military regime. 
Adding DUME and DUMF to regression equations (4) and (5) (Table II) containing 
the revenue share in GDP and the debt service share of the budget indicates that both 
regime-type dummy variables are significant and are of the expected sign, with slightly 
better results obtained by DUMF. Regime changes may result in structural shifts in 
the expenditure function (change intercept) as shown above or in the propensity to 
spend out of one or more of the determinants of expenditure (revenues, deficits, or 
debt). 
To examine possible changes in the propensity to increase the share of government 
expenditures in GDP out of public debt associated with regime changes, the yearly 
figures for debt service were multiplied by the corresponding value for DUME and 
DUMF. Introducing the resulting dummy variable (DUMEX and DUMFX) into 
regression equations (6) and (7) (Table II) indicates that both variables were highly 
significant and of the expected sign. 
Apparently, however, regime change in Argentina is only spuriously correlated with 
the share of government expenditures in GDP; introducing the public sector deficit 
to the regression equations (8), (9), (10) and (11) (Table II) results in a loss of statistical 
significance for the regime change dummies. 
In short, regime changes per se in Argentina have not affected the share of public 
sector expenditure in GDP over and above the influence on the size of the public sector 
deficit. On the other hand, there is clear evidence (Table II) that regime changes have 
had a clear impact on the relative shares of various budgetary categories and, hence, 
on priorities determining various budgetary trade-offs. 
Research Design 
A review of the trade-off literature will show that there has been some controversy 
over how the expenditure variables should be measured in order to test properly for 
budgetary trade-offs. Peroff and Podolak-Warren point out that the "choice of measure 
clearly affects the results of the analysis — depending on whether the budget is 
expanding, stable or contracting". They argue persuasively with logic and examples 
that a negative trade-off may not be detected between absolute or per capita measures 
of, say, defence and non-defence-policy expenditures if the budgetary process is, in 
fact, an expanding sum game represented by a growing public sector, as in Argentina's 
case in the period under question (see Peroff and Podolak-Warren, 1979, pp. 24-5). 
Therefore, in order to assess policy commitments and relative policy priorities, the 
analysis below measures debt service and other public sector allocations as percentages 
of total public budget. Public sector allocations to various uses in social services, etc., 
are treated as the dependent variable in the regression analysis that follows; the share 
of the budget allocated to interest payments on the public sector debt is entered as 
the first independent variable. It is expected that as the burden of debt service increases, 
the shares of other budgetary items will decrease; that is, a substitution effect or 
negative trade-off is hypothesised. 
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It is apparent, however, that the share of any particular budgetary category may 
change over time for reasons unrelated to the increasing share of public sector resources 
allocated to debt service. There may be systematic increases or decreases in the share 
of, for example, education in the budget as per capita income increases or as 
government expenditures per capita increase. Furthermore, the share of any budgetary 
allocation may change as the public sector deficit increases or decreases relative to 
GNP; i.e., expansionary phases of the budgetary process or austerity programmes may 
systematically affect the share of the budget allocated to specific uses. 
With regard to austerity, anecdotal evidence suggests that officials may follow rather 
ad hoc rules for making large contractions in a short period of time, e.g. cutting new, 
rather than on-going projects, new rather than present employment, materials and 
travel expenses rather than personnel, and favoring ministries that are politically 
powerful or reducing those that had expanded most rapidly in the past (see Caiden 
and Wildavsky (1974)). 
In general[8], the programmes, once enlarged, seem difficult to reduce, particularly 
if they generate employment benefits. Likewise, governments seem unwilling to reduce 
areas that are supported by foreign assistance, both because they fear antagonising 
aid donors and for the more practical reason that savings from such expenditure cuts 
are significantly less, since aid is also reduced by a proportionate amount. 
As to the choice of which sectors to cut back, it is often felt that some sectors are 
more "vulnerable" than others to reductions. The defence sector, particularly, is usually 
considered difficult to reduce, while other sectors, particularly the social sectors such 
as health, education and rural development are considered vulnerable. 
The alleged vulnerability of the social sectors is clearly evident in writings coming 
from the World Bank, as the following quotes from Hicks and Kubisch (1983) indicate: 
In the difficult past few years, budgetary crises have often meant that social services were 
cut back, in the process unravelling carefully designed programs (World Bank, 1983b, p. 52). 
Since many human development programs are publicly funded, they are especially vulnerable 
when growth is threatened and budgets are under pressure . . . The recurrent cost of social 
programs, especially salary costs, tended to make them a permanent and, therefore, vulnerable 
part of the government budgets (World Bank, 1981, pp. 97-8). 
Quick-fix relief through disproportionate cutbacks — in, for example, education or rural 
development — may well have negative consequences for the entire economy (World Bank, 
1983a, p. 5). 
Many member countries have had to reduce and re-orient investment programs to curtail 
recurrent expenditures and to delay the completion of high priority development projects. 
Programs in health, education and other social sectors have been particularly vulnerable 
(World Bank, 1984, p. 1). 
In the crisis situations confronting African governments, education, training and health 
programs are continuously in danger of becoming the residual legatees of both resources 
and of attention by policy makers (World Bank, 1983c, p. 30). 
Despite these rather strongly held views and such circumstantial evidence, little 
empirical investigation has been made on the vulnerability of different sectors to 
reductions in public expenditure. In a recent study[9] of 37 cases of budgetary 
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reductions (countries where real expenditures declined in one or more years), the 
vulnerability of different sectors to budgetary reductions were examined. Here, 
vulnerability was loosely defined as: 
(1) A sector was well-protected if expenditures on it were reduced by less than the 
percentage reduction in total expenditures. 
(2) A sector was vulnerable if its percentage of reduction exceeded the average. 
In brief, a simple ratio for percentage changes in sectoral expenditures to those in 
total spending served as the measure of vulnerability. Where the ratio had a value 
greater than one, it indicated that the sector was highly vulnerable; while a value 
between zero and one indicated low vulnerability, with less than proportional reductions 
in the relevant sector. A negative value indicated that, despite overall expenditure 
reductions, the sector was allowed to expand. 
Based on an aggregation of the results from 37 observations, Hicks and Kubisch 
(1984) found an average decline of 13 per cent in real government expenditures, while 
the decline for the social sector was only 5 per cent. Using their methodology, this 
produced a vulnerability index of 0.4. By contrast, the index was 0.6 for 
administrative/defence sectors and over 1.0 for production and infrastructure. In sum, 
social sectors was less vulnerable to cuts than defence and administration, which, in 
turn, were considerably less vulnerable than production and infrastructure — contrary 
to the generally accepted view. 
The fact that social sectors and defence were both relatively protected suggests that 
there were high political costs associated with reducing them. On the other hand, 
countries appeared to have been more willing to cut spending on infrastructure and 
production which had adverse implications for longer-term growth prospects, but fewer 
early, direct and immediate political consequences. 
These conclusions were not very different for countries belonging to different income 
groups. The low income countries appear to have afforded slightly more protection 
to the social sectors and production and slightly less to administration and defence, 
but the difference was marginal. The middle income countries, such as Argentina, 
by contrast gave more protection to administration and defence and less to production 
and infrastructure sectors. The apparent bias toward maintaining expenditures in the 
social services and defence may reflect the government's preference for present 
consumption over investment and future consumption, since social sectors and defence 
typically have a heavy bias toward recurrent expenditures and within these there is 
a sizeable employment component. 
It is possible, therefore, that government leaders in Argentina have found it more 
acceptable to reduce investment, growth and future consumption, especially if these 
reductions are uncertain and far off, than to make politically difficult cost cuts in 
present consumption. Since the social sectors and defence administration are relatively 
labour intensive with high recurrent costs, reducing expenditures on them not only 
cuts back services highly valued by the public, but also causes relatively high 
unemployment per unit of reduction. 
In order to take these effects into account and, at the same time, improve the 
specification of the regression models (obtain less biased estimates of the budgetary 
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trade-offs associated with increased debt servicing), several control variables were 
introduced into the regression equations. Long-run movements in the share allocated 
to particular uses were captured by either government expenditures per capita (GEPOP) 
or per capita income (YPOP). These variables were added to capture the "Wagner's 
Law" effect[10]. 
Wagner argued that public expenditure could be divided into two categories, security 
and welfare, and that security expenditure was bound to increase with the growth of 
the progressive state as armies became larger and more capital intensive. In addition, 
further intra-state conflict between individuals was generated by industrialisation, 
necessitating increased police control. In a similar manner, welfare expenditures would 
also increase with the level of economic development as the state gradually took over 
many of the private sector's former responsibilities such as education and public health. 
To account for short run changes in budgetary shares associated with austerity or 
expansive phases of government spending, the share of the central government fiscal 
deficit (PPSD) in GDP was introduced into the regression equation. 
Finally, as noted above, there may be a relationship between broad allocations for 
defence, social welfare, and economic development and political regimes in Argentina. 
In the literature on the military in politics, a number of efforts have been made to 
link patterns of military and social welfare spending to regime type. In these studies, 
regimes are categorised in terms of the institutional base of regime incumbents. That 
is, the regime is characterised as military if incumbents are in office as the result of 
a military coup; civilian if the incumbents are elected. Patterns of spending of regimes 
identified as civilian or military have frequently been compared in order to examine 
the possible linkage between military influence over the decision-making process in 
allocating resources. The usual presumption is that the military will be more inclined 
to increase the relative budgetary share allocated to defence and internal security, and 
perhaps economic development. Presumably, these budgetary increases occur at the 
expense of social welfare programmes. 
To account for the influence of regime type on the budgetary share allocated to 
different sectors, the two political dummy variables (DUME and DUMF) defined above 
were added to the regression equation[ll]. 
Model Specification 
The following linear trade-off equations were estimated for the 1961-82 period. The 
signs of the coefficients represent the expected direction of the relationships. 
Yi = A - b1x1i + b2x2i + b3x3i + b4x4i + RHO + ui 
Where: Yi = share of the government budget allocated to sector i; A = the intercept 
of the regression equation; x1 = share of the government budget allocated to debt 
service; x2 = government expenditure per capita or per capita income (whichever was 
most significant in the regression equation); x3 = the central government deficit as 
a per cent of GDP; x4 = political dummy variable, DUME or DUMF (as defined 
above) to account for military-civilian regime changes[12] and b4 is assumed to be 
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positive for defence, administration, domestic security and economic development and 
negative for social services and welfare; RHO is the Cochrane-Orcutt[13] serial 
correlation factor; ui = disturbance term. 
It should be noted that both dummy variables, DUME and DUMF, identify possible 
shifts in the sectoral budgetary share associated with regime change; i.e., the possible 
existence of a change in the regression intercept stemming from regime change. 
A second set of dummy variables, DUMEX and DUMFX, were formed by 
multiplying the debt service share of the government budget by the political shift 
variable DUME or DUMF. The new dummy (DUMEX and DUMFX) measures the 
change in the propensity to cut back sectoral allocations with an increase in debt service 
shares in the budget; i.e., the possible existence of a change in the slope of the regression 
equation. 
Both sets of dummy variables were tested. In general, DUME and DUMF were 
superior indicators of the impact of regime change on budgetary shares. Cases where 
DUMEX or DUMFX were superior are indicated by an asterisk (*). The regression 
results (Table III) show several interesting patterns[14]. 
Table III. Argentina: External Debt Service-Budgetary Trade-Offs: 1961-1982 
Equation Sector 
(1) Public administration 
(2) Fiscal control 
(3) 





(9) Air Force 
(10) Domestic security 
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(20) Medical care 
(21) 
(22) Public health 
(23) Social security 
(24) 
(25) Housing 
(26) Other social 








































































































































































































































Notes: (1) Equations estimated using Cochrane-Orcutt iterative estimation procedure to correct for serial correlation. 
(2) *Denotes that the change in the slope of the regression equation associated with regime change was more 
significant than the change in intercept stemming from regime change. 
(3) See text for definition of symbols. 
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(24) Public health 
(25) 
(26) 



























































(42) Other Economic 
development - 0.09 
(-2.20) 
Notes: See Table III. 
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In general debt service per se appears to have reduced the budgetary shares of all 
other major expenditure categories. However, this reduction has not been across the 
board, but instead appears to be concentrated in certain categories. In particular, of 
the major budgetary categories, reductions in funding due to increased debt service 
obligations appear to have been concentrated in defence (-0.19), and total social 
services (-0.87). Within the social service categories, education (-0.28), and medical 
care (-0.79), appear to have borne the brunt of debt related budgetary cut-backs. 
On the other hand, in several cases varying priorities associated with specific regimes 
tended to offset the cutbacks associated with increased debt service payments. Here, 
defence and domestic security were the chief beneficiaries of the general shift toward 
military regimes, with economic services benefitting to a somewhat lesser degree. For 
several sectors, however, a combination of debt service and regime change combined 
to cause major budgetary cutbacks. Total social services and in particular primary 
education and housing experienced severe setbacks from these combined sources. 
In general, Wagner's Law type effects were not nearly as significant in affecting 
budgetary shares over time as were the debt service and regime change effects. As 
anticipated by Wagner's Law, the share of the budget allocated to domestic security 
did increase over time as per capita government expenditures expanded. Wagner's Law 
may also have accounted for the slight expansion in total social services during this 
period. Also as predicted by Wagner, several social sub-categories, i.e., social security 
and health allocations expanded during the period under consideration. Interestingly 
enough, a major budgetary category, defence, did not increase over time as a result 
of increased per capita public sector expenditures. 
In general, the most interesting aspect of the results obtained appears to be the 
manner in which the political process and budget deficits have tended to modify the 
sectoral cutbacks mandated by the country's mounting debt service obligations. 
While the results are enlightening, the specification of the model may be too 
restrictive. Intuitively, one would anticipate that increased debt servicing obligations 
would not have an immediate impact on sectoral budgetary allocations, but instead 
that this impact would be felt over time, i.e., increases in debt service payments would 
exert some pressure on the authorities to reduce, say, social expenditures this year, 
but because of budgetary rigidity and the difficulty of cancelling on-going programmes, 
some of the reductions would not be undertaken until the following year or the year 
after. Such a causal spread over a period of time is often estimated in terms of a 
distributed lag function. The linear regression procedure may be tailored to incorporate 
such effects. For example, it can be demonstrated that an equation of the Koyck form: 
Y = ax + byL + z 
implies an exponential decay scheme, whereby the effect of a permanent increase in, 
say, debt service obligations (ax) would influence the share of the government budget 
allocated to social services not only in the current time period, but would have (in 
declining terms) an impact on their share in future years. It can be shown that this 
result stems directly from the inclusion of the social service share of the budget (byL) 
lagged one year on the right hand side of the equation. 
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The results (Table IV) for the distributed lag estimates of the impact of increased 
debt servicing on the sectoral share of the Argentine central government budget over 
the 1961-82 period indicate that in general this specification yielded (in terms of the 
values for R2 ) better statistical results than those obtained from the simple linear direct 
impact specification. Adjustments over time (as evidenced by the statistical significance 
of the lagged sector share term) have been particularly pronounced in several of the 
sub-categories such as education, health and housing. Apparently, these sectors 
experience considerable inertia and or resistance to reductions associated with increased 
debt servicing obligations. 
As in the case of the direct impact estimates (Table III), political change in Argentina 
modified the overall sectoral share reductions brought on by increased debt servicing 
obligations. In particular, the defence share and its main components were protected 
by regime change, while several of the social sub-categories found their shares reduced 
even further by regime change. The major exceptions to this pattern were the high 
priorities afforded to several sub-categories such as public health and social security 
by the military regimes. Transportation's share in the budget may also have been 
positively affected by military regimes. 
It appears that the expanding public sector deficits during this period were used 
largely to finance several social subcategories such as medical care and social security. 
On the other hand it is apparent that austerity measures (periods of reduced deficits) 
took their greatest tole on public health and economic development (especially 
agriculture and other economic expenditures). 
Again, as with the direct impact estimates, there appears to be some doubt as to 
whether political regime change is best depicted by considering the first military and 
civilian regimes as similar in the budgetary priorities or somewhat different, with the 
first military regime preferring military and economic allocations over social 
expenditures. 
Conclusions 
In terms of the questions posed at the beginning of this study, it appears that in 
Argentina's case a significant (and negative) relationship exists between debt service 
and most of the major budgetary categories, with social services receiving the largest 
budgetary reductions. On the other hand the country's increasing budgetary deficits 
have to a certain extent offset the debt service impact on these activities. 
In general the time phasing of these budgetary changes has been spread out over 
time in a distributed lag fashion, rather than concentrated in major short-run shifts 
in allocation. Finally, regime change has played a significant role over time in affecting 
major shifts in Argentine budgetary priorities, with military regimes tending to reinforce 
many of the negative impacts on the social sector brought about by increased debt 
service burdens (while neutralising the debt service affects on defence expenditures). 
It is clear however, that the simple dichotomy between civilian and military regimes 
may not be appropriate for Argentina; significant differences exist among both civilian 
regimes and their military counterparts. In fact there is a good case that each civilian 
and military regime can be characterised as having its own unique set of budgetary 
priorities[15]. 
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On a more technical level, the failure of several studies[16] to find negative trade-
offs between defence expenditures and education may stem from the incorrect 
specification of the regression models used in estimation. As indicated above, most 
sectoral budgetary shares are affected by political change, long-run expenditure trends, 
short-run deficit and austerity impacts and lagged adjustment effects. Failure to control 
for these variables may mask the actual budgetary trade-off patterns to produce the 
apparent lack of budgetary conflicts. 
In the same vein, the results presented above may throw into some doubt results 
purporting to demonstrate the general validity of Wagner's Law. It appears that 
movements in budgetary shares over time may be determined by a much more complex 
set of factors than those originally envisaged by Wagner. 
Notes 
1. Notable studies in this area include: Vener (1983), Hayes (1976), Ames and Goff (1976), Peroff 
and Podolak-Warren (1979), Russet (1969) and Peroff (1977). 
2. See, for example: McKinlay and Cohan (1975), McKinlay and Cohan (1976) and Cohen (1985). 
3. A closely related issue is the nature of budgetary cutbacks during periods of austerity. See, for 
example, the excellent study by Hicks and Kubisch (1984); and Looney (1986). 
4. The World Bank (1985, Vol. 2, Statistical Appendix). All of the regression estimates in this study 
are based on data from this report. 
5. See World Bank (1985, Vol. 1, The Main Report, pp. 32-47). 
6. In fact a good deal of the debt contracted for during the late 1970s and early 1980s may have 
been utilised for increasing defence expenditures and arms imports. One estimate places US$5-10 
billion of the country's accumulated US$45 billion debt by 1983 as directly incurred for military 
purchases, see Tullberg (1985, p. 453). 
7. See Most (1980), Pion-Berlin (1983), O'Donnell ( ), O'Donnell (1978) and Sheahan (1980). 
8. A thorough analysis of these conditions is given in Goode (1984). 
9. Hicks and Kubisch (1984). A longer version of this research is contained in N. Hicks and A. Kubisch, 
"The Effects of Expenditure Reductions in Developing Countries (Washington: IBRD), mimeo, 
November 10, 1983. 
10. An excellent discussion of this phenomenon is given in Lotz (1970). 
11. One major concern with the data used in the analysis is that the official Argentine figures on 
government defence expenditures may have been underestimated. See Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (1983, pp. 181-9) for a discussion of the accuracy of Latin American defence 
data. The World Bank measure used here, however, is a more inclusive measure and therefore 
overcomes to a certain degree this limitation. See World Bank (1985, Vol. 1, pp. 46-9) for a description 
of the adjustments made to the country's official figures on defence allocations. 
12. A description of the use of dummy variables to test for structural shifts in time series data is given 
in Christ (1966, pp. 521-31). 
13. For a description of the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure used, plus a documentation of the regression 
package, see Hall and Hall (1980). 
14. In the analysis, total social services include: (a) education and culture, (b) health, (c) social security 
and welfare, (d) housing, and (e) other social services. Total economic development includes: (a) 
transportation, (b) mining and industry, (c) energy and fuels, (d) agriculture, and (e) other economic. 
Results are listed in the table if they were statically significant at the 95 per cent level, and can 
be interpreted as indicating (for example equation (1) that a one per cent increase in the share 
of debt service in the government's budget reduces public administration's share by 0.10 per cent. 
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15. See, however, Grosse (1982). 
16. For example, Verier (1983). 
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